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ZIVOTOFSKY v. KERRY: CHOOSING INTERNATIONAL 
REPUTATION OVER SEPARATION OF POWERS 
HANNAH COLE-CHU∗ 
In June 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry.1  In Zivotofsky, the Court considered the constitutionality of Section 
214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003, which permitted 
a United States citizen born in Jerusalem to record the birthplace on his or 
her passport as “Israel.”2  Menachem Biyamin Zivotofsky, a United States 
citizen, was born in Jerusalem soon after the statute was enacted, and his 
parents applied for a passport and a Consular Report of Birth Abroad on his 
behalf.3  They requested that the United States Embassy record his 
birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.”4  The embassy refused, citing U.S. State 
Department policy authorizing it to designate only “Jerusalem” as the 
birthplace on passports of United States citizens born in Jerusalem.5  
Seeking to enforce Section 214(d), Zivotofsky’s parents brought suit.6 
After more than a decade litigating the justiciability of Zivotofsky’s 
claims, the Supreme Court reached the merits of the case.7  Zivotofsky 
argued that the United States violated his statutory right to record his 
birthplace as “Israel” on his passport, which Congress conferred on him 
pursuant to its Article I lawmaking power.8  The United States responded 
that the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on the President’s 
exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns.9  Specifically, Section 
214(d) contradicted the President’s longstanding policy of neutrality over 
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 1.  135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 2.  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d), 
116 Stat. 1350, 1365–66 (2002), declared unconstitutional by Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 
(2015).  
 3.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, Nos. 03-1921, 03-2048, 2004 WL 5835212, at *1 
(D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004), rev’d, 444 F.3d 614 (2006).  
 7.  See infra Part I.  
 8.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 9.  Id. at 2084. 
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the status of Jerusalem.10  The Court sought to determine whether the 
President had the exclusive recognition power, and, if so, whether Section 
214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 infringed on that 
power.11 
Ultimately, the Zivotofsky Court struck down the statute.12  The 
majority held that the President has the exclusive power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns and determine recognition policy, and that Congress 
could not force the President to contradict formal statements of 
recognition.13  The Court reasoned that the United States must have a single 
recognition policy announced by “one voice,” and that voice must be the 
President’s.14  The Court determined that Section 214(d), in allowing 
United States citizens born in Jerusalem to record their birthplace as 
“Israel,” forced the President to contradict his position of neutrality as to the 
status of Jerusalem.15  For this reason, the statute was unconstitutional.16 
In Zivotofsky, the Court confronted a remarkable legal panorama.  At 
first glance, Zivotofsky was a separation of powers case involving a dispute 
over power between Congress and the President.  The precise configuration 
of the dispute, however, was unique.  First, Zivotofsky involved the very 
rare occasion in which the President intentionally contravened an act of 
Congress.17  Zivotofsky was also remarkable because virtually no legal 
precedent existed to guide the Court’s analysis of the scope and allocation 
of the recognition power.18  Historical practice of the recognition power, 
moreover, was sufficiently inconsistent that it did not provide any guidance 
as to how the power should be allocated.19 
Additionally, Zivotofsky was a separation of powers case in the realm 
of foreign affairs.  The debate over the division of power between Congress 
and the President in foreign affairs is as old as the Nation itself and, without 
doubt, remains unresolved.20  Supreme Court precedent is infused with 
competing and contradictory theories of separation of powers, and it 
provides what seems, at times, rudderless guidance.21 Finally, Zivotofsky 
                                                          
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. at 2081.  
 12.  Id. at 2096.  
 13.  Id. at 2094–95.  
 14.  Id. at 2086. 
 15.  Id. at 2094.  
 16.  Id. at 2096.   
 17.  See infra Part II.B.  
 18.  See infra Part II.A. 
 19.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091.   
 20.  See infra Parts II.B., IV.A–B. 
 21.  See infra Part II.B.  
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implicated the ancient conflict over the status of Jerusalem, arguably the 
most sensitive international conflict in the world.22 
Acknowledging the significant doctrinal challenges and sensitivity of 
the issue in Zivotofsky, this Note argues that the Court erred in striking 
down Section 214(d).23  The Court correctly held that the President has the 
exclusive power to effect recognition and determine recognition policy.24  
The Court erred, however, in holding that Congress may not force the 
President to contradict statements regarding recognition.25  This rule, which 
defines what constitutes “infringement” of the recognition power, 
encompasses otherwise constitutionally enacted legislation and 
impermissibly invades Congress’s Article I legislative powers.  Instead, the 
Court should have limited its definition of infringement only to the exercise 
of the recognition power itself by any branch other than the President.26  
Accordingly, Section 214(d), which was not a formal act of recognition, did 
not infringe on the President’s exclusive recognition power.27  Moreover, 
the statute is independently constitutional under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.28 
In Zivotofsky, the Court also seized an opportunity to decide issues 
completely separate from the merits of Zivotofsky’s claims.  The Court 
corrected two of the greatest flaws in foreign affairs jurisprudence: Justice 
Sutherland’s theory of inherent executive power and his mischaracterization 
of the sole organ theory—both introduced by United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.29  In doing so, the Zivotofsky Court signaled a shift in 
the theoretical framework through which it has decided foreign affairs cases 
towards a more balanced theory of separation of powers in foreign affairs.30 
I.  THE CASE 
In 2002, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (the 
“Act”).31  Section 214(d) of the Act provides: “[f]or purposes of the 
registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of 
a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, 
upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the 
                                                          
 22.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2081.   
 23.  See infra Part IV.C–D. 
 24.  See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 25.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 26.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 27.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 28.  See infra Part IV.D.  
 29.  299 U.S. 304 (1936).  See infra Part IV.A. 
 30.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 31.  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 
1350 (2002).  
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place of birth as Israel.”32  Shortly thereafter, Menachem Binyamin 
Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to Ari Zivotofsky and Naomi Siegman, 
both United States citizens.33  In December 2002, Zivotofsky’s mother went 
to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to apply for a passport and a 
Consular Report of Birth Abroad34 on her son’s behalf, and requested that 
the documents record his birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.”35  The Embassy 
refused, explaining that U.S. State Department policy would only permit 
“Jerusalem” to be listed as Zivotofsky’s birthplace.36 
Seeking to enforce Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Zivotofsky’s parents filed suit against the Secretary of 
State in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 
2003.37  Zivotofsky sought a declaratory judgment, claiming that the 
Secretary of State’s failure to follow the mandate of Section 214(d) 
breached a duty owed to Zivotofsky.38  Additionally, Zivotofsky sought an 
injunction ordering the Secretary of State to issue a Consular Report of 
Birth Abroad and a U.S. passport recording “Jerusalem, Israel,” as 
Zivotofsky’s birthplace, and to order consular personnel at U.S. embassies 
and consulates to comply with Section 214(d).39  Approximately one month 
after Zivotofsky filed his complaint, U.S. citizen parents of another child 
born in Jerusalem, E.O. Odenheimer, filed a Writ of Mandamus in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, bringing similar 
claims against the Secretary of State.40  Because of the common issues 
presented, the district court consolidated the two cases.41 
The Government moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on several 
grounds, including that Zivotofsky and Odenheimer lacked standing, the 
case presented a nonjusticiable political question, and the statute was 
permissive rather than mandatory.42  In a brief opinion, the district court 
                                                          
 32.  § 214(d), 116 Stat. at 1366.  
 33.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015).  
 34.  A Consular Report of Birth Abroad is “a formal document certifying the acquisition of 
U.S. citizenship at birth of a person born abroad.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FAM § 1441(a) (2015), 
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/07FAM/07FAM1440.html.  The abbreviation “FAM” is short for 
“Foreign Affairs Manual.” 
 35.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, Nos. 03-1921, 03-2048, 2004 WL 5835212, at *2 
(D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004), rev’d, 444 F.3d 614 (2006). 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  Among several claims, Odenheimer’s parents argued that the Secretary of State 
breached a duty to Odenheimer by failing to comply with § 214(d), and violated Odenheimer’s 
equal protection and due process rights.  Id. 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
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held that Zivotofsky’s and Odenheimer’s claims were not justiciable.43  
First, the court held that the Secretary of State’s failure to record 
“Jerusalem, Israel” on the plaintiffs’ passports was not an injury in fact 
sufficient to confer standing.44  Second, the district court held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims constituted a nonjusticiable political question.45  A core 
issue in the case, the court reasoned, was the authority to recognize 
sovereigns and conduct foreign policy—a power constitutionally committed 
to the President.46  As such, the case fell within the ambit of the defining 
political question case, Baker v. Carr,47 and cases establishing that the 
recognition of sovereigns is committed to the Executive.48  Therefore, 
because the cases were not justiciable, the district court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims.49 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court’s holding and ruled that 
Zivotofsky had standing.50  Relying primarily on Linda R.S. v. Richard 
D.,51 the court of appeals explained that Congress conferred a statutory right 
on Zivotofsky to record “Israel” as his birthplace on his passport, which 
was violated when the Secretary of State refused to do so, and this violation 
was sufficient to show standing.52  The court of appeals also held that the 
district court’s basis for ruling that Zivotofsky’s claim constituted a 
political question was incorrect.53  Specifically, the district court 
erroneously framed the issue in the case as implicating the recognition 
power, which is solely a function of the President.54  Instead, the issue was 
whether Section 214(d) entitled Zivotofsky to have “Israel” listed as his 
place of birth on his passport and Consular Birth Report, and, if so, whether 
                                                          
 43.  Id. at *4.   
 44.  Id. at *3.  The court argued that “the mere existence of a statute does not negate ‘the 
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.’”  Id. (quoting 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)).  
 45.  Id. at *4. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (“recognition of foreign governments . . . strongly defies 
judicial treatment”).  
 48.  Zivotofsky, 2004 WL 5835212, at *4 (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707–08 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); United States v. Cty. 
of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1982)).  
 49.  Zivotofsky, 2004 WL 5835212, at *4.  
 50.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2006), remanded to 511 F. 
Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007).  
 51.  410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the 
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”).  
 52.  Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 619 (citing Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3). 
 53.  Id.; see supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.  
 54.  Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 619. 
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this right was mandatory or advisory.55  The court of appeals remanded the 
case to develop the record on this issue.56 
On remand, the parties engaged in discovery and filed dispositive 
motions on the political question issue.57  The district court again held that 
Zivotofsky’s claims presented a political question and dismissed the case.58  
Zivotofsky appealed a second time, and the court of appeals affirmed.59  
This time the court of appeals framed the issue as “whether the State 
Department [could] lawfully refuse to record [Zivotofsky’s] place of birth 
as ‘Israel’ in the face of a statute that directs it to do so.”60  The court 
concluded that it could not reach this issue, however, because the 
President’s recognition power is exclusive, and policy decisions implicating 
the recognition power are nonjusticiable political questions.61  Section 
214(d)’s requirement, the court explained, implicated one of those policy 
decisions.62  In a lengthy concurring opinion, one judge argued that judicial 
review was appropriate and required only that the court determine whether 
Section 214(d) was constitutional.63  The statute was unconstitutional, the 
judge concluded, because it infringed on the exclusive recognition power of 
the President.64 
Zivotofsky filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the United 
States Supreme Court granted on May 2, 2011.65  The issues before the 
Court were whether Zivotofsky’s claim constituted a nonjusticiable political 
question and, if not, whether Section 214(d) impermissibly infringed on the 
President’s power to recognize foreign sovereigns.66 
In what would ultimately be the first of two Zivotofsky opinions, the 
Supreme Court held that Zivotofsky did not constitute a nonjusticiable 
political question.67  The Court explained that the lower courts improperly 
framed the issue as requiring a determination of whether Jerusalem is the 
                                                          
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 620. 
 57.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 571 F.3d 
1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
 58.  Zivotofsky, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 102.  The district court held that Zivotofsky presented an 
issue (A) textually committed to the political branches of the government; (B) lacking judicially 
manageable standards for resolving the issue; and (C) impossible to resolve without expressing 
lack of respect to coordinate branches of government.  Id. at 103–05. 
 59.  Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1233, reh’g en banc denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 
132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).  
 60.  Id. at 1230.  
 61.  Id. at 1231.  
 62.  Id. at 1233. 
 63.  Id. at 1240 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 64.  Id. at 1245.  
 65.  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (mem.). 
 66.  Id.   
 67.  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–27, 1430 (2012), remanded to 725 F.3d 
197, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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capital of Israel.68  Instead, the issue in the case was whether Section 214(d) 
was constitutional, the determination of which depended on whether the 
statute impermissibly intruded upon presidential power.69  Determining the 
constitutionality of a statute, the Court explained, was precisely within the 
purview of the judiciary and, as a result, the case was justiciable.70  The 
Court declined to discuss the merits of Zivotofsky’s claims, and instead 
vacated judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address 
the constitutionality of Section 214(d).71 
Before the D.C. Circuit for the third time, the court held that Section 
214(d) was unconstitutional because the President has the exclusive power 
to recognize or withhold recognition of a sovereign, and Section 214(d) 
infringes on that power.72  The court relied on longstanding post-ratification 
history, Supreme Court precedent, and the proposition that “the President 
has ‘a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which 
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.’”73  Because 
Section 214(d) “runs headlong into a carefully calibrated and longstanding 
Executive branch policy of neutrality toward Jerusalem,” the statute was 
unconstitutional.74 
Zivotofsky again filed a writ of certiorari, which the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted.75  The first issue before the Court was whether the President 
has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign 
sovereign.76  The second issue was whether, in the event the President has 
the exclusive recognition power, Congress can command the President to 
issue a formal statement that contradicts the earlier recognition.77 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Several intersecting constitutional analyses determine the outcome of 
the issues in Zivotofsky.  First, though courts have dealt peripherally with 
the recognition power in a handful of cases, none involve a dispute between 
Congress and the President over the scope and nature of the recognition 
power.78  This remarkable lack of legal authority leads to the second area of 
                                                          
 68.  Id. at 1427.  
 69.  Id. at 1428.  
 70.  Id. (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)).  
 71.  Id. at 1431.  
 72.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197, 214, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 135 S. 
Ct. 2076 (2015).  
 73.  Id. at 211 (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445 (1998) (quoting 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).  
 74.  Id. at 220.  
 75.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 134 S. Ct. 1873 (2014) (mem.). 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  See infra Part II.A.  
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analysis: how the United States Supreme Court has historically determined 
constitutional power in the realm of foreign affairs.79  The Constitution 
enumerates few powers relating to foreign affairs and, as a result, the Court 
relies heavily on theories of separation of powers to determine the outcome 
of foreign affairs cases.80  At different points in history, however, the Court 
has applied different theories to define congressional and presidential power 
in foreign affairs.81  As a result, jurisprudence regarding foreign affairs is at 
best inconsistent and at worst irreconcilable. 
Independent of recognition, Congress and the President share the 
power to regulate passports.82  Though the Court has never ruled on 
Congress’s constitutional authority to enact passport legislation, Congress 
has enacted many passport laws and the Court, in substantial part, has 
assumed the constitutionality of those laws.83  Moreover, Congress has 
broad authority to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of foreign 
commerce through the Foreign Commerce Clause of Article I.84 
A.  No Binding Legal Precedent Exists Involving a Dispute Between 
Congress and the President over the Recognition Power 
“Recognition is the act by which ‘a state commits itself to treat an 
entity as a state or to treat a regime as the government of a state.’”85  A 
formally recognized foreign country may bring suit in United States 
courts,86 benefit from the act of state doctrine,87 and exercise sovereign 
immunity.88  An act of recognition is retroactive and “validates all actions 
and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of 
its existence.”89  Furthermore, formal recognition allows for the initiation of 
official diplomatic relations.90  Determinations of recognition are binding 
on the judiciary, and are not subject to judicial review.91  Courts may, 
however, discuss the legal consequences of recognition.92  
                                                          
 79.  See infra Part II.B. 
 80.  See infra Part II.B. 
 81.  See infra Part II.B. 
 82.  See infra Part II.C. 
 83.  See infra Part II.C. 
 84.  See infra Part II.D.  
 85.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 94(1) (1965)).  
 86.  Guar. Tr. Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938).  
 87.  Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 
U.S. 250, 253 (1897).  
 88.  Nat’l City Bank of New York v. China, 348 U.S. 356, 358–59 (1955).  
 89.  United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937).  
 90.  Guar. Tr. Co. of New York, 304 U.S. at 138.  
 91.  See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410–11 (1964) 
(explaining that the judiciary may not permit a government not recognized by the executive 
branch to file suit because that could be construed as an act of judicial recognition); Nat’l City 
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Despite the importance of the recognition power to international 
relations, very little primary legal authority discusses it.  The text of the 
Constitution does not contain any express reference to the recognition 
power, and scant historical evidence provides little indication the Framers 
intended to commit the recognition power to any one branch of the federal 
government.93  Moreover, the Court has never addressed a dispute between 
Congress and the President over the scope and nature of the recognition 
power.  Supreme Court precedent involving the recognition power holds 
that only the federal government may exercise the recognition power,94 but 
the Court’s statements of how that power is allocated within the federal 
government consists of conflicting dicta.95  Some cases define the 
recognition power as shared between Congress and the President.96  Other 
cases state that the recognition power is exclusively the domain of the 
President.97  Notably, the distribution of the recognition power within the 
                                                          
Bank of New York, 348 U.S. at 358 (declining to review the status of the Republic of China 
because it was “outside the competence of [the] Court”); Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302 (quoting Jones v. 
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (holding that recognition policy is conclusively binding 
on a court)); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839) (holding that the assumption of 
sovereignty of a foreign country is binding on courts); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 
610, 634–35 (1818) (arguing that any decision by a court that constitutes an act of recognition 
would “transcend the limits prescribed to the judicial department”).  
 92.  Guar. Tr. Co. of New York, 304 U.S. at 139.  
 93.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197, 206–07 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 
2076 (2015).  On remand, the D.C. Circuit explained that the Federalist papers make no mention 
of the recognition power and there is no record that recognition was discussed at the 
Constitutional Convention.  Id.  The only ratification-era evidence discussing the recognition 
power, the court argued, was a writing by Hamilton in 1793, published under the name 
“Pacificus” declaring that the “receive ambassadors” clause gave the President power over 
recognition.  Id. (citing United States National Archives, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), 
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=pacificus&s=1111311111&sa=&r=7&sr=).   
 94.  United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).  In Pink, the Court held that a state may 
not reject an act of recognition by the federal government because “[s]uch power is not accorded a 
State in our constitutional system,” and to allow it would be a “dangerous invasion of Federal 
authority.”  Id.; see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1937) (holding that 
federal action in foreign affairs is binding on state constitutions, laws, and policies).   
 95.  See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.  
 96.  Guar. Tr. Co. of New York, 304 U.S. at 137 (“[Recognition] . . . is to be determined by 
the political department of the government.”); Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302 (explaining that the 
sovereignty of a nation “is a political question” to be determined “by the legislative and executive 
departments”); Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 645 (“[T]he courts of the union must view such 
newly constituted government as it is viewed by the legislative and executive departments of the 
government of the United States.”) .  
 97.  See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (“Political 
recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive.”); Nat’l City Bank of New York v. China, 
348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955) (holding that recognition is a “matter for determination by the 
Executive”); Pink, 315 U.S. at 229 (holding that the President has the power to both determine a 
policy of recognition and then make that determination); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 (explaining it 
“may not be doubted” that the President has power to implement policies to effect recognition); 
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839) (holding that the executive branch of the 
government, “charged” with managing foreign relations, makes determinations of recognition).  
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federal government was not at issue in any of these cases.  Instead, existing 
case law involving the recognition power involves state or judicial action 
implicating recognition.98 
B.  Supreme Court Precedent Discussing Presidential Power in 
Foreign Affairs Is Inconsistent Because the Court Has Relied on 
Multiple Theories of Separation of Powers 
The text of the United States Constitution enumerates few powers 
relating to foreign affairs.  The President is the Commander in Chief99 and 
has the duty to receive ambassadors from other nations.100  Congress has the 
power to regulate foreign commerce, raise armies, issue letters of marque 
and reprisal, and to declare war.101  The President and Congress share the 
power to enter into treaties, and appoint ambassadors and other public 
officials.102  Because the actual conduct of foreign affairs involves much 
more than the text of the Constitution expressly contemplates, conflicts 
regularly arise between Congress and the President over how this power is 
allocated.103  When the political branches resort to the courts to resolve a 
dispute over power in foreign affairs, the Court, often without guidance 
from the text of the Constitution, routinely relies on theories of separation 
of powers to determine the outcome of the dispute.104 
At different points in history, however, the Court has invoked different 
theories of separation of powers to resolve conflicts between Congress and 
the President.  Indeed, the Court’s two most famous foreign affairs 
                                                          
 98.  See supra notes 91 & 94.  
 99.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 100.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.  
 101.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 102.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  
 103.  One significant exception to this proposition exists, which is of particular importance to 
Zivotofsky: the President’s role as the sole organ of communication with foreign nations has not 
been subject to significant challenge in the courts.  See infra Part IV.B. The doctrine, also called 
the “one voice” doctrine, most commonly appeared in foreign commerce cases as a rationale for 
prohibiting states from participating in foreign commerce.  See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cty. of 
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979) (holding that courts should consider the extent to which a 
commerce law “prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice when regulating 
commercial relations with foreign governments’”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 
(1937) (holding that the President has power to effect recognition “as the sole organ of [the 
federal] government”).  The sole organ doctrine has also been referred to as a textually committed 
power of the President not subject to review by courts.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–12 
(1962) (explaining that not all foreign affairs cases present political questions, but some demand a 
“single-voiced statement of the Government’s views”).  See generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 
U.S. 678, 700, 711 (2001) (noting the importance that the nation “speak with one voice”); Crosby 
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000) (arguing that the issue in the case 
“compromise[s] the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in 
dealing with other governments”); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003) 
(same).  
 104.  See infra notes 105–106. 
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decisions appear to be diametrically opposed.  In United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., a case challenging President Truman’s exercise of 
unilateral action during the Korean War, the Court declared that the 
President has inherent and plenary authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign 
affairs.105  Sixteen years later, however, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,106 Justice Jackson stated in his canonical concurring opinion that 
the President’s power to act in any situation—including in foreign affairs—
depends on its “disjunction or conjunction” with the powers of Congress.107  
What distinguishes these and other Supreme Court cases involving foreign 
affairs are the underlying theories that guide the Supreme Court to reach its 
conclusion.  One holds that the President has broad and inherent power, and 
the other subjects presidential power to the control of Congress.108  Curtiss-
Wright and Youngstown, each with its own legacy, represent the ever-
present and unresolved debate over separation of powers in foreign 
affairs.109 
In the early years after the Constitution was ratified, the Court viewed 
presidential power in foreign affairs as almost completely dependent on 
express congressional authorization and, therefore, strictly construed all 
delegations of power.110  The President was prohibited from acting in 
foreign affairs without a statutory delegation of power111 or other 
authorizing act, such as declaring war.112  The Court eventually recognized 
one narrow instance when the President could act unilaterally: to repel 
immediate and internal attacks.113 Against this background, Curtiss-Wright 
marked the introduction of a drastically different view of presidential power 
in foreign affairs: the President has inherent power to conduct foreign 
                                                          
 105.  299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).  
 106.  343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
 107.  Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 108.  To quote Justice Jackson in Youngstown, this dichotomy of presidential power is an 
“over-simplified grouping.”  Id.  It is, nevertheless, a useful framework through which to review 
foreign affairs precedent as it relates to Zivotofsky.  
 109.  Justice Jackson noted in Youngstown, “A century and a half of partisan debate and 
scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from 
respected sources on each side of any question.  They largely cancel each other.”  343 U.S. at 
634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 110.  See, e.g., Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28–29 (1801) (upholding the U.S. 
recapture of a French vessel based exclusively on statutory grants of power and explaining that 
“the whole powers of war” are vested in Congress and one must examine “acts of congress” to 
understand American hostilities with France); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229–30 
(C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (holding that despite the President’s approval of a secret mission, 
the Constitution does not vest the President with authority to engage in a military expedition 
against a county with which the United States is at peace).  
 111.  See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178–79 (1804) (prohibiting the President 
from construing a statute to give it greater effect even during wartime hostilities because doing so 
was acting beyond the authority granted by Congress).  
 112.  Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1229–30. 
 113.  The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 691–92 (1863).  
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affairs.114  In Curtiss-Wright, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to the President.115  The 
greatest legacy of the case, however, is not its holding, but Justice 
Sutherland’s extraordinary discussion of the origin and nature of 
presidential power in foreign affairs.116 
Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland first argued that the source 
of the President’s power in foreign affairs originates outside the 
Constitution.117  In domestic affairs, he explained, the federal government 
may only exercise those powers specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution.118  The Founders vested these express grants of constitutional 
power in the federal government by carving them from powers possessed 
by the states.119  The power to conduct foreign affairs, however, was never 
possessed by the states, and, therefore, could not have been stripped from 
the states and vested in the federal government.120  The power instead 
passed directly from the British Crown to the federal government, vesting it 
with the power to conduct foreign affairs independent of any affirmative 
grant of power by the Constitution.121 
Justice Sutherland used this distinction to argue that the President’s 
power in foreign affairs was inherent and plenary.122  He quoted a speech by 
then-Congressman John Marshall, given on the floor of the House of 
Representatives in 1800,123 to support his conclusion that the President is 
not only the “sole representative” of the nation,124 but also the “sole organ 
of the federal government in the field of international relations.”125  He 
continued, arguing that there is little room for Congress to participate in 
foreign affairs: 
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, 
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.  He 
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
alone negotiates.  Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot 
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.126  
                                                          
 114.  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).  
 115.  Id. at 329.  
 116.  Id. at 315–22.  
 117.  Id. at 316.  
 118.  Id. at 315–16.  
 119.  Id. at 316.  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 318.   
 122.  Id. at 320.  
 123.  Id. at 319 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)).  
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. at 320.  
 126.  Id. at 319. 
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Ultimately, Justice Sutherland concluded that when a President acts 
pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority, and that action 
implicates foreign relations, the Court should not strictly construe 
congressional delegations of power.127 
Despite the Court acknowledging that these passages are dicta,128 
Justice Sutherland’s conception of presidential power secured so strong a 
foothold in separation of powers jurisprudence that courts began to 
regularly rely on Curtiss-Wright in cases involving questions of presidential 
power.129  In 1942, Justice Stone quoted Curtiss-Wright in United States v. 
Pink130 to argue that the President has broad authority to put policies in 
place that give effect to a recognition decision because he is the “sole organ 
of the federal government in the field of international relations.”131  Curtiss-
Wright also paved the way for the Court to uphold many instances of 
unilateral presidential action during World War II.132 
Sixteen years after Curtiss-Wright, the Court decided Youngstown, 
marking yet another drastic shift in how it viewed separation of powers in 
                                                          
 127.  Id. at 322.  
 128.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  
 129.  See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (sustaining the President’s decision to 
restrict travel to Cuba due to “traditional deference to executive judgment” in foreign affairs); 
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293–94 (1981) (stating that it is “generally accepted” that foreign 
policy is the domain of the President); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 n.1 (1979) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (“The Court has recognized that, in the area of foreign policy, Congress 
may leave the President with wide discretion.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556–57 
(1975) (arguing that a congressional delegation of power should be not be construed stringently 
when the President “possesses independent authority over the subject matter”); N.Y. Times v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining that the President’s 
power in foreign affairs is “largely unchecked” by other branches); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 
(1965) (arguing that when Congress delegates the President authority in foreign affairs, it must 
“paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas”); Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (explaining that the President is exclusively responsible for 
the conduct of foreign affairs); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (emphasizing 
that the right to exclude aliens “stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the 
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation” (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304; 
then citing Fing You Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893))); Chicago & Southern Air 
Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (declining to review an executive order 
because the President is the Nation’s “organ for foreign affairs”).  
 130.  315 U.S. 203 (1942).  
 131.  Id. at 229 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320).  
 132.  See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1942) (citing Curtiss-Wright to support 
deference to an executive action pursuant to congressional delegation); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) (upholding an executive order authorizing “every possible 
protection” against spies and saboteurs); Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 (1944) 
(“Broad powers frequently granted to the President or other executive officers by Congress so that 
they may deal with the exigencies of wartime problems have been sustained.”); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1944) (relying on Hirabayashi to again uphold the executive 
order authorizing “every possible protection” against spies and saboteurs).  
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foreign affairs.133  In Youngstown, President Truman issued an executive 
order seizing control of most of the steel mills in the United States, which 
he argued was constitutional pursuant to his “inherent power” as 
president.134  The Court struck down the order, rejecting the general trend 
of cases following Curtiss-Wright.135  Similar to Curtiss-Wright, the merits 
of Youngstown have faded into history. What remains, however, is Justice 
Jackson’s scheme of presidential power.136 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson set forth three categories of 
presidential power based on their “disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress.”137  The first category applies where the President acts pursuant 
to the express or implied authorization of Congress; in these instances, his 
authority is at its maximum.138  The second category refers to a 
constitutional “zone of twilight,” where the President acts in absence of 
either a congressional grant or denial of authority.139  Under these 
circumstances, the President can rely only on his own powers.140  The final 
category refers to when the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress.141  Here, the President’s power is “at 
its lowest ebb,” and he can rely only on his powers minus Congress’s power 
over the matter.142 
Of particular relevance to Zivotofsky is Jackson’s final category, 
referred to as the “Third Category” or a “lowest ebb case.”  For this brand 
of conflict, Jackson anticipated an exception: “Courts can sustain exclusive 
Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject.  Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive 
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the 
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”143 
Justice Jackson relegated Curtiss-Wright to a footnote144 and flatly 
rejected the concept of inherent powers.145  In the years since Youngstown, 
                                                          
 133.  Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579.  
 134.  Id. at 582, 583–84, 589.  
 135.  Despite imminent labor strikes that would shut down American steel mills and 
discontinue the production of steel during the Korean War, the Court held that President Truman 
did not have statutory or constitutional authority to seize the steel mills.  Id. at 588–89.  In so 
holding, the Youngstown majority expressly rejected President Truman’s assertion of “inherent 
power” to issue the executive order.  Id.   
 136.  Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 137.  Id. at 635.  
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. at 637.   
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id.   
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 637–38 (footnote omitted).  
 144.  Id. at 635–36 n.2.  
 145.  Id. at 652.  
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courts have relied on Justice Jackson’s scheme of power between the 
political branches to determine the scope of presidential power in foreign 
affairs. 
C.  The Court Views the President’s Power over Passport Regulation 
as Dependent on Congressional Delegation 
A passport is “a travel document . . . issued under the authority of the 
Secretary of State attesting to the identity and nationality of the bearer,”146 
and is proof of United States citizenship.147  Federal law prohibits a person 
from entering or exiting the United States without a passport,148 though this 
law is subject to several exceptions.149 
In the first fifty years after the Constitution was ratified, Congress 
passed several laws regulating passports.150  During that time, however, the 
federal government did not have exclusive control over all passports, and 
officials at all levels of local, state, and federal government issued various 
types of documents certifying citizenship or introducing foreign officials to 
other sovereign states.151  Congress sought to establish a uniform passport 
policy in 1856 when it enacted a general passport statute, broadly 
authorizing the Secretary of State and “no other person” to grant and issue 
passports.152  This statute eventually became the Passport Act of 1926,153 
                                                          
 146.  22 C.F.R. § 51.1 (2015). 
 147.  22 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012) (A passport “shall have the same force and effect as proof of 
United States citizenship as certificates of naturalization.”); see also Magnuson v. Baker, 911 F.2d 
330, 334 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that 22 U.S.C. § 2705 was “a clear instruction from Congress to 
treat passports in the same manner as certificates of citizenship or certificates of naturalization in 
all respects”).  But see United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a 
passport only serves as conclusive proof of U.S. citizenship if the bearer was a U.S. citizen at the 
time of issuance). 
 148.  8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2012); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293 (1981) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1185).  
 149.  22 C.F.R. § 53.2(b) (2015).  Among several enumerated exceptions, the State Department 
allows members of the U.S. Armed Forces to enter the United States when carrying a military 
identification card, and has discretion to waive the passport requirement due to unforeseen 
emergency or humanitarian reasons.  Id. §§ 53.2(b)(1), (9), (10).  
 150.  Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 122 (1958) (listing passport statutes from the early 
nineteenth century); see also Act of Feb. 4, 1815, § 10, 3 Stat. 195, 199–200 (prohibiting a citizen 
from crossing into enemy territory without a passport).  
 151.  Kent, 357 U.S. at 123.  
 152.  Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52, 60–61 (to regulate the diplomatic and 
consular systems of the United States).  The Supreme Court has discussed the possibility that 
Congress’s enactment of broad passport legislation delegating substantial discretion to the 
Secretary of State reflects the originalist understanding that passport regulation was primarily the 
domain of the Secretary of State.  See Agee, 453 U.S. at 293 (explaining that it was the “common 
perception” that the President had sole discretion over issuing passports during the ratification 
era); Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835) (explaining that the requirements for 
applying for a passport are “entirely discretionary” with the Secretary of State).  But see Kent, 357 
U.S. at 128–29 (explaining that Congress did not allow the Secretary of State “unbridled 
discretion” over passport regulations).  
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which remains the federal government’s general passport statute.154  The 
Passport Act delegates broad authority to the Secretary of State to “grant 
and issue” passports “under such rules as the President shall designate.”155  
Pursuant to this delegation of authority, the Secretary of State has discretion 
over determining eligibility, issuing regulations pertaining to denial or 
revocation, and establishing procedures for review of denials and 
revocations, among other aspects of passport regulation.156  Despite this 
delegation of authority, Congress still exercises its power to enact 
legislation affecting different aspects of passport regulation.157 
Courts have faced challenges to the validity of passport regulations, 
but the cases focus on the extent to which the Secretary of State may 
exercise discretion over passport regulation.158  The Supreme Court has 
determined that the range of the Secretary’s discretion depends on the 
congressional delegation of power.159  Where the delegation is not express, 
the Court will look to congressional acquiescence and prior administrative 
practice to determine the Secretary of State’s authority over passports.160  
Curiously, courts have not directly addressed Congress’s constitutional 
authority to enact passport legislation.161  The Supreme Court, in cases 
                                                          
 153.  Act of July 3, 1926, Pub. L. No. 493, 44 Stat., Part I, 887 (regulating the issuance and 
validity of passports).  
 154.  22 U.S.C. § 211a (2012). 
 155.  Id.  
 156.  See generally 22 C.F.R. § 51.1–51.74 (2015) (passport regulations).  The State 
Department elaborates on these regulations in its Foreign Affairs Manual.  U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 
7 FAM § 1300 (2015), https://fam.state.gov/Fam/FAM.aspx?ID=07FAM.  
 157.  8 U.S.C. § 1504 (2012) (cancellation of U.S. passports and consular reports of birth); 18 
U.S.C. § 1542 (2012) (false statement in application and use of passport); 18 U.S.C. § 1543 
(2012) (forgery or false use of passport); 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (2012) (misuse of passport); 22 U.S.C. 
§ 212a (2012) (restriction of passports for sex tourism); 22 U.S.C. § 2714 (2012) (denial of 
passports to certain convicted drug traffickers); 42 U.S.C. § 652(k) (2012) (denial of passports for 
nonpayment of child support). 
 158.  See infra notes 159–160 and accompanying text.  
 159.  See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 290–91 (1981) (holding that the Passport Act of 
1926 authorizes the President to revoke a passport based on concerns for national security); Zemel 
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1965) (holding that the Secretary of State had statutory authority to 
impose area travel restrictions); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that the 
Passport Act of 1926 did not delegate authority to the Secretary of State to deny passports based 
on political affiliation).  
 160.  Agee, 453 U.S. at 296–97 (explaining that Congress never attempted to repudiate the 
Secretary of State’s revocations of passports for national security concerns); Zemel, 381 U.S. at 
17–18 (reasoning that the Secretary of State had imposed area restrictions on many occasions 
without protest from Congress); Kent, 357 U.S. at 128 (explaining that the Secretary of State’s 
regulation regarding denial of a passport was invalid because it was based on grounds not 
contemplated by the Passport Act of 1926); see also Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) (explaining that Kent and Zemel “make plain” that the Passport Act of 1926 “is broader than 
the authority it confers”).  
 161.  Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), dealt with the constitutionality of a 
statute that prohibited a member of the Communist party from applying for or using a passport.  
Id. at 502.  The Court ultimately found the statute unconstitutional, but not because Congress did 
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dealing with passport legislation, has assumed the Passport Act is 
constitutional and, consequently, Congress’s authority to enact passport 
legislation.162 
D.  Congress Has Broad Authority to Regulate Conduct Abroad Under 
the Foreign Commerce Clause 
The Constitution provides, “[t]he Congress shall have the Power . . . 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”163  Referred to as the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, this provision does not have as robust a body of case 
law as the Interstate Commerce Clause.164  It is generally agreed, however, 
that the Foreign Commerce Clause is extremely broad, conferring exclusive 
and plenary authority on Congress to regulate foreign commerce with 
foreign nations.165  A handful of cases even argue that the scope of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause is greater than that of the Interstate Commerce 
Clause because Congress is not limited by federalism or state sovereignty 
concerns.166 
The term “commerce” encompasses to “travel, trade, traffic, 
commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any foreign 
country . . . and any State.”167  Like its interstate analogue, the Foreign 
Commerce Clause comprehends the regulation of channels and 
instrumentalities of foreign commerce.168  Its reach extends to goods and 
                                                          
not have the authority to enact it.  Id. at 514, 517; see also Zemel, 381 U.S. at 6 (attacking the 
validity of the Passport Acts of 1926 and 1952 on the grounds that the statutes were unlawful 
delegations of lawmaking power to the Executive).  
 162.  Zemel, 381 U.S. at 7–9 (discussing the legislative history of the Passport Act of 1926); 
Kent, 357 U.S. at 122–25 (detailing congressionally enacted passport statutes at length without 
questioning the constitutionality of their enactment).  
 163.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 164.  United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the scope of the 
Foreign Commerce Clause “has yet to be subjected to judicial scrutiny”). 
 165.  See California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59 (1974) (explaining that 
Congress’s plenary authority to regulate foreign commerce is “well established”); Bd. of Trustees 
of Univ. of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933) (foreign commerce power is 
“exclusive and plenary”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824) (stating that 
Congress’s Commerce Power includes “every species of commercial intercourse between the 
United States and foreign nations”).  
 166.  E.g., Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103  (arguing that evidence exists that the Founders intended 
the scope of the foreign commerce power to be greater than the interstate commerce power) 
(citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cty., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979))).  But see Pittsburgh & S. 
Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895) (“The power to regulate commerce among the several 
States was granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations.”).  
 167.  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 263 (1964).  
 168.  Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 444  (instrumentalities); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, 333 U.S. 
103, 104–05 (1948) (channels); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875) 
(channels); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 72 (channels).  United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 
1218 (11th Cir. 2005), defines channels of commerce as the “transportation routes through which 
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services,169 international travel by people,170 and conduct in foreign 
countries that affects United States interests.171 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, holding that Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act was unconstitutional.172  The Court first concluded that the text and 
structure of the Constitution imply that the President has the power to 
recognize foreign sovereigns.173  Next, the Court determined that precedent, 
historical practice, and functional considerations demonstrate that the 
President’s recognition power is exclusive,174 and that Congress may not 
force the President to contradict his own statements regarding 
recognition.175  The Court found that Section 214(d) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act forced the President to contradict his statement 
of recognition with respect to Jerusalem.176  As a result, Section 214(d) 
infringed on his exclusive recognition power and, therefore, was 
unconstitutional.177 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, framed the issue in 
Zivotofsky as falling in the third category of Justice Jackson’s three-tiered 
framework of presidential power.178  Both parties acknowledged that 
because the President was acting in contravention of a statute, his power 
was “at its lowest ebb,” and the Court could only sustain it if the power is 
both “‘exclusive’ and ‘conclusive’ on the issue.”179  Within this framework, 
the majority first held that the text and the structure of the Constitution 
                                                          
persons and goods move,” and instrumentalities as “the people and things themselves moving in 
commerce.”  Id. at 1225–26 (citations omitted).  
 169.  United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 807 n.19, 807–08 (W.D. Tex. 2009) 
(child prostitution services).  
 170.  United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904); Clark, 435 F.3d. at 
1114 (holding that the defendant traveled in foreign commerce by traveling from the United States 
to Cambodia).  
 171.  Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620 (1927); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit 
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1909); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) (prohibiting the 
kidnapping of any person and transportation of that person in foreign commerce); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423 (2012) (prohibiting travel in foreign commerce for the purpose of committing illicit sexual 
conduct abroad).  
 172.  135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015).  
 173.  Id. at 2086. 
 174.  Id. at 2094.  
 175.  Id. at 2095. 
 176.  Id. at 2094. 
 177.  Id. at 2096. 
 178.  Id. at 2083.  
 179.  Id. at 2084 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)).   
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imply that the President has the power to formally recognize foreign 
sovereigns.180  Specifically, the majority determined that the text and 
structure of the Reception Clause, the Treaty Clause, and the Appointment 
Clause imply that the President has a recognition power.181  The Reception 
Clause directs that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other 
public Ministers.”182  When the Constitution was ratified, the Court argued, 
it was commonly understood that receiving an ambassador was a de facto 
act of recognition.183  Additionally, as a matter of constitutional structure, 
the President’s power over treaties and the appointment of public officials 
demonstrates that the President can engage in activities that may lead to 
recognition, such as nominating ambassadors and negotiating treaties.184  In 
contrast, Congress has no constitutional power to initiate diplomatic 
relations with a foreign government.185 
The Zivotofsky Court next held that the President has the exclusive 
recognition power—including the power both to effect recognition and 
determine recognition policy.186  The Court based this conclusion, first, on 
the fact that the President can effect recognition unilaterally in several 
different ways, while Congress cannot.187  Second, the Court reasoned that 
functional considerations suggest that the recognition power is exclusively 
vested in the President.188  Specifically, the United States must only have 
one policy with respect to whether a given government is legitimate 
because foreign countries need to know their status before entering into 
diplomatic relations or commerce with the United States.189  Additionally, 
the Court argued, “Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must 
‘speak . . . with one voice.’”190  That voice, the Court explained, must be the 
President’s because his is the only branch that has the “characteristic of 
unity at all times.”191  Additionally, the President can engage in “the 
                                                          
 180.  Id. at 2085.  Formal recognition is “formal acknowledgment that the entity possesses the 
qualifications for statehood.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. a (1987).  The formal acknowledgment may be written, oral, or 
implied by concluding a treaty or receiving ambassadors.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084. 
 181.  Id. at 2085. 
 182.  Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 183.  Id. at 2085. The majority noted that although the Reception Clause “received little 
attention at the Constitutional Convention,” scholars at that time wrote that “receiving an 
ambassador was tantamount to recognizing the sovereignty of the sending state.”  Id. (citing 
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 78 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson, 1852)). 
 184.  Id. at 2085–86. 
 185.  Id. at 2086.  
 186.  Id. at 2094.  
 187.  Id. at 2085–86 (explaining that the President may unilaterally effect recognition by 
dispatching or receiving an ambassador or directly engaging in diplomacy with a foreign nation). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 2086 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)).  
 191.  Id.  
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delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts that may lead to a decision on 
recognition,” and can more easily take “decisive, unequivocal action 
necessary to recognize other states.”192 
Third, the Court argued that precedent supports its conclusion that the 
President’s recognition power is exclusive.193  The Court began by 
acknowledging that virtually no binding legal precedent exists on the 
specific issue presented in Zivotofsky.194  Although it has resolved disputes 
over the recognition power between the federal government and the states, 
and the judiciary and the political branches, the Court has never dealt with a 
conflict between the President and Congress.195  The Court also noted, 
“some isolated statements in those cases lend support to the position that 
Congress has a role in the recognition process.”196  Notwithstanding, the 
Court argued that Supreme Court precedent supports the conclusion that it 
is exclusive.197  The Court pointed to United States v. Pink,198 for example, 
which stated that the President has authority “to determine the policy which 
is to govern the question of recognition.”199  The Court cited even stronger 
language in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino:200 “[p]olitical 
recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive.”201  Conceding that 
the cases went both ways, the Court argued Banco Nacional further 
supported the conclusion that the President’s recognition power is 
exclusive.202 
Fourth, the Court explained that since the ratification era, the President 
has unilaterally exercised the recognition power on many occasions and, for 
the most part, Congress has acquiesced.203  President Washington, the Court 
highlighted, unilaterally recognized the French revolutionary government in 
1793 by receiving a French ambassador representing the new 
government.204  President Washington did not consult with Congress and 
                                                          
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. at 2091.  
 194.  Id. at 2088.  
 195.  Id. (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (federal government and the states); 
then citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (federal government and 
the judiciary)).  
 196.  Id. at 2088. 
 197.  Id.; see supra Part II.A.   
 198.  315 U.S. 230. 
 199.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2088 (quoting Pink, 315 U.S. at 229). 
 200.  376 U.S. 398. 
 201.  Id. at 2089 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 410).  The Court also relied on 
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, which held that “[t]he status of the 
Republic of China in our courts is a matter for determination by the Executive and is outside the 
competence of this Court.”  348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955).  
 202.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2088. 
 203.  Id. at 2091. 
 204.  Id. at 2091–92. 
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Congress did not protest the reception of the ambassador.205  Similarly, 
when President Carter recognized the People’s Republic of China and 
derecognized the Republic of China, Congress did not challenge the 
President’s exclusive authority to effect recognition.206  On occasion, the 
Court conceded, Congress and the President have acted together to 
recognize foreign sovereignties.207  The Court concluded, however, that for 
most of the twentieth century the President recognized new governments 
without any “serious opposition”208 from Congress, and there has been little 
debate that the power is exclusively vested in the President.209 
Next, the Court held that Congress may not force the President to 
contradict an earlier statement on recognition.210  The Court reasoned that, 
as a “matter of both common sense and necessity,”211 the President’s 
exclusive recognition power includes not only the initial, formal 
recognition, but also subsequent statements by him and his agents on 
recognition.212  If Congress could override the President’s recognition 
determination, the Court reasoned, the recognition power would be 
meaningless.213  As such, the Court held that Congress may not enact a law 
that forces the President to contradict an act of recognition.214 
The Zivotofsky Court emphasized that the President has no greater 
authority to act in foreign affairs than he does on domestic issues.215  The 
Court explained that although the President has a unique role in 
communicating with foreign governments, he is bound by laws that 
Congress enacts, which ensures that “the democratic will of the people is 
observed and respected in foreign affairs as in the domestic realm.”216  In 
accordance with this theory, the majority declined to adopt the 
Government’s argument that Curtiss-Wright grants the President “broad, 
                                                          
 205.  Id. at 2092.  
 206.  Id. at 2094.  
 207.  Id. at 2091.  The Court cited the recognition of the Republic of Texas in 1835, Liberia 
and Haiti in 1861, and the revolutionary government of Cuba in 1898 as examples where the 
President collaborated with Congress on acts of recognition.  Id. at 2092–93.  
 208.  Id. at 2093 (quoting Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power 
Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013). 
 209.  Id. at 2093–94. 
 210.  Id. at 2095.   
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. at 2094–95. 
 213.  Id.  
 214.  Id.  Sensing the breadth of its holding, the Court was careful to specify that although 
Congress is disabled from acting on the subject of recognition, the subject is “quite narrow”; it is 
limited only to formal recognition determinations.  Id.; see supra note 180. 
 215.  Id. at 2090 (“But whether the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the Legislative 
Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the law.”). 
 216.  Id. at 2088.  Congress’s role in foreign affairs, the Court explained, is essential because it 
is a check on presidential power.  Id. at 2090.  The Court stated, “The Executive is not free from 
the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”  Id.  
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undefined powers over foreign affairs.”217  The Court also repeatedly 
stressed Congress’s essential role in formulating policy and enacting 
legislation in foreign affairs.218  Moreover, the Court noted, ruling that the 
President has the exclusive recognition power does not leave the President 
with uncheckable power; if Congress disagrees with an act of recognition 
by the President, Congress may refuse to dispatch an ambassador or engage 
in commerce with that nation.219  Congress may not, however, force the 
President to contradict an earlier statement on recognition.220 
Finally, the Zivotofsky Court held that Section 214(d) 
unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s exclusive recognition 
power.221  The provision, as written, entitles children born in Jerusalem to a 
U.S. passport stating that they were born in “Israel.”222  According to the 
President and longstanding U.S. policy, however, children born in 
Jerusalem are not born in Israel.223  In this sense, the provision “directly 
contradicts” the President’s decision to withhold recognition of Jerusalem 
as belonging to any sovereign.224  For this reason, the Zivotofsky Court 
found Section 214(d) is unconstitutional, and it affirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals.225 
Justice Breyer joined the majority, but filed a brief concurring opinion 
arguing that he believed the case presented a political question.226  Justice 
Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part.227  Justice Thomas agreed that Section 214(d) was unconstitutional, 
but disagreed with the Court’s reasoning.228  Sidestepping recognition 
                                                          
 217.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2089.  The Court added that, first, Curtiss-Wright dealt with 
whether a congressional delegation of power to the President was constitutional, and the broad-
sweeping descriptions of unbounded power were dicta.  Id. at 2090.  Second, any pronouncement 
of presidential authority in foreign affairs beyond the recognition power would be unnecessary to 
resolve the issue in Zivotofsky.  Id. at 2089.  
 218.  Id. at 2087 (explaining that Congress has “substantial authority regarding many of the 
policy determinations that precede and follow the act of recognition itself”); id. at 2088 
(“Congress has an important role in other aspects of foreign policy.”); id. at 2090 (“[I]t is essential 
that the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.”).  
 219.  Id. at 2087. 
 220.  Id. at 2095.   
 221.  Id.  
 222.  Id. at 2094.  
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Id. at 2096.  
 226.  Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in the 2012 
Zivotofsky case, arguing that the case presented a political question.  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. 
Ct. 1421, 1437 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  He was precluded from doing so again because 
that case, which held that Zivotofsky did not constitute a political question was now binding 
precedent.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 
1437 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).   
 227.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 228.  Id. at 2097.  
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altogether, he argued that as a passport law, Section 214(d) fell within the 
President’s “residual” foreign affairs power through Article II’s Vesting 
Clause.229  In support of his argument, Justice Thomas pointed to historical 
evidence that the President has consistently controlled the issuance of 
passports since the ratification era.230  When Congress has enacted passport 
legislation, he argued, the laws have always been narrow in scope and 
acknowledged broad executive discretion on the subject.231  Justice Thomas 
concluded that despite Zivotofsky’s arguments to the contrary, Congress 
had no authority to enact Section 214(d) pursuant to its foreign commerce 
or naturalization powers, or through the Necessary and Proper Clause.232 
Justice Thomas further argued that Section 214(d) did not implicate 
recognition because, essentially, Israel has already been recognized by the 
United States.233  The question of sovereignty over Jerusalem, in contrast, is 
a question of potential change to Israel’s territory.234  He explained, 
“[l]isting a Jerusalem-born citizen’s place of birth as ‘Israel’ cannot amount 
to recognition because the United States already recognizes Israel as an 
international person.”235  In essence, Justice Thomas argued, the majority 
relied on a distorted definition of “recognition.”236 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, filed a 
dissenting opinion.  Justice Scalia first argued that Congress had authority 
to enact Section 214(d) pursuant to its powers over naturalization.237  
Congress’s naturalization power, he argued, enables it to “furnish the 
people it makes citizens with papers verifying their citizenship.”238  Next, 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Constitution grants the President 
power over recognition, but disputed that it was exclusive.239  Even if it did, 
Justice Scalia argued, Section 214(d) did not implicate recognition.240  The 
                                                          
 229.  Id. at 2101.  Justice Thomas argued that certain powers are expressly enumerated to 
either or both political branches, and all “residual” foreign powers are vested in the President 
through Article II’s Vesting Clause.  Id.  
 230.  Id. at 2101–02. 
 231.  Id. at 2103. 
 232.  Id. at 2104.  Justice Thomas would have held, however, that Section 214(d) was 
constitutional with respect to the Consular Report of Birth Abroad.  Id. at 2111.  While the 
statute’s application to passports was unconstitutional because it fell under the President’s residual 
foreign affairs powers, Congress has authority over Consular Reports of Birth Abroad through its 
powers over naturalization.  Id.  
 233.  Id. at 2112. 
 234.  Id.  
 235.  Id.  
 236.  Id. at 2112–13. 
 237.  Id. at 2117 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 238.  Id.  
 239.  Id. at 2118.  
 240.  Id.  
 888 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:865 
statute does not “require the Secretary to make a formal declaration about 
Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem,” and thus should have been upheld.241 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, filed a separate 
dissenting opinion to highlight the majority’s “error on a basic question of 
separation of powers.”242  Even if Section 214(d) implicated the recognition 
power, Chief Justice Roberts argued the President failed to demonstrate that 
his power is “so conclusive and preclusive” that it “disabl[es] the Congress 
from acting on the subject.”243  Turning first to the text, Chief Justice 
Roberts explained that the majority’s reliance on the Reception Clause is 
weak because receiving ambassadors is a duty, not a power.244  
Additionally, the President’s other enumerated foreign powers are shared 
with Congress, which undermines the conclusion that the President’s 
recognition power is exclusive.245  Chief Justice Roberts next argued that 
the legal precedents consist only of “conflicting dicta,” and history points in 
both directions.246  And, while congressional acquiescence may provide 
guidance when the President acts without congressional authorization, here, 
the President acted contrary to a duly enacted statute.247 Ultimately, Chief 
Justice Roberts concluded that Section 214(d) did not warrant allowing the 
President to contravene an act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs for 
the first time in history.248 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court held that the President had the 
exclusive power to determine recognition policy and effect recognition, and 
Congress could not force the President to contradict acts or statements of 
formal recognition.249  The Court further held that Section 214(d), although 
not a formal act of recognition, forced the President to contradict a formal 
statement of recognition.250  For these reasons, the statute was 
unconstitutional. 
In addition to addressing the merits of Zivotofsky’s claims, the Court 
corrected two significant flaws promulgated by Justice Sutherland in United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.251  In doing so, the Court signaled a 
                                                          
 241.  Id.  
 242.  Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 243.  Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)).  
 244.  Id. at 2113.  
 245.  Id. at 2114. 
 246.  Id.  
 247.  Id.  
 248.  Id. at 2116. 
 249.  Id. at 2096 (majority opinion).   
 250.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 251.  See infra Part IV.A. 
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shift in the theoretical framework through which it analyzes foreign affairs 
cases implicating separation of powers.252  Within this framework, the 
Court correctly held that the President has exclusive recognition power.253  
The President’s exclusive power to effect recognition fits uncontroversially 
under his broader authority as sole organ of communication with foreign 
governments.254  Regarding the President’s power to determine recognition 
policy, the Court reached the correct conclusion but did not conduct a 
sufficiently exacting analysis.255  The Court should have concluded that the 
President has exclusive power to determine recognition policy through his 
residual foreign affairs power derived from the Vesting Clause of Article 
II.256 
Although it correctly concluded that the President has exclusive power 
to effect recognition, the Court erred in holding that Section 214(d) was 
unconstitutional.257  First, in holding that Congress may not force the 
President to contradict his statements on recognition, the Court erroneously 
articulated a far-reaching rule that encompasses otherwise constitutionally 
enacted legislation.258  This rule too greatly infringes on Congress’s 
lawmaking power, and represented an attempt to strike down legislation 
that compromised the United States’ neutral policy towards Jerusalem at the 
cost of our system of separation of powers.259  Instead, the Court should 
have limited the scope of infringement only to other formal acts of 
recognition.260  Applying this rule, Section 214(d) would not have infringed 
on the President’s exclusive recognition power.261  Finally, the Court should 
have concluded that Section 214(d) is constitutional pursuant to Congress’s 
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause.262 
A.  The Court Properly Rejected Curtiss-Wright’s Theory of Inherent 
Power and Set Forth a Balanced Theory of Division of Powers 
Between Congress and the President in Foreign Affairs 
In Zivotofsky, the Court seized an opportunity to reject Curtiss-
Wright’s flawed theory of inherent power.  On its face, the text of the 
opinion appears to do nothing more than distinguish Curtiss-Wright on its 
                                                          
 252.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 253.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 254.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 255.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 256.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 257.  See infra Part IV.D.  
 258.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 259.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 260.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 261.  See infra Part IV.C.   
 262.  See infra Part IV.D. 
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facts.263  The Court went out of its way, however, to affirmatively dismiss 
Curtiss-Wright’s dangerous theory of inherent power and correct Justice 
Sutherland’s misinterpretation of Chief Justice John Marshall’s sole organ 
theory.  The Court did this by stressing that the President’s power is no 
greater in foreign affairs than in domestic,264 and that Congress has an 
important role in formulating and implementing foreign policy.265  
Additionally, it correctly cited Chief Justice John Marshall’s “sole organ” 
speech as acknowledging the President’s “unique role in communicating 
with foreign governments” and not as a source of inherent power.266  These 
aspects of the Zivotofsky opinion show an attempt by the Court to shift the 
theoretical framework through which it decides foreign affairs cases to a 
more balanced division of power between Congress and the President. 
Curtiss-Wright’s first great flaw is Justice Sutherland’s argument that 
the President’s inherent power to conduct foreign affairs derives from a 
source outside the Constitution.267  This theory is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, commentators have refuted Justice Sutherland’s theory that power 
over foreign affairs passed directly from the British Crown to the federal 
government and not the states.268  Soon after declaring independence, in 
fact, Congress affirmatively allocated British “sovereignty” to the states—
not the federal government—and specified that each state retained every 
power not expressly delegated to the central government.269  Moreover, in 
the years between declaring independence and ratifying the Constitution, 
the states were active in foreign affairs.270  Individual states engaged in 
foreign trade, signed treaties, and sought to borrow money from other 
countries.271  In addition to this historical evidence, Professor Louis Henkin 
points out that the text of both the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution deny states key foreign affairs powers.272  If the states never 
                                                          
 263.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015) (distinguishing Curtiss-Wright 
because it involved the constitutionality of a congressional delegation of power, which was 
irrelevant to Zivotofsky).  
 264.  Id. at 2090; see supra note 215.  
 265.  See supra note 218.  
 266.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090.  
 267.  See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text.  
 268.  See infra notes 269–271.  
 269.  Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical 
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1973).  Professor Lofgren argues, “[f]or Sutherland . . . another 
government was evidently the only possible source for these powers of sovereignty.”  Id. at 14.  
 270.  LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
107–08 (6th rev. ed. 2014).   
 271.  David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s 
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 486 (1946).  
 272.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  Article I, § 10 prohibits the states from entering into treaties, 
entering into agreements with foreign countries, taxing imported goods, and keeping troops or 
ships during a time of peace.  Id.; see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 151–52 (2nd ed. 1996) (discussing the Constitution’s express denial and implicit 
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had the power to participate in foreign affairs, these limitations would be 
redundant.273 
The second reason that Justice Sutherland’s inherent powers theory is 
incorrect is because, simply, the theory is inconsistent with the most 
fundamental principle of United States government: all authority derives 
from the Constitution’s enumerated powers, and implied powers 
“reasonably drawn” from enumerated powers.274  Inherent power, in 
contrast, is not drawn from the Constitution, and is thus not subject to its 
carefully placed limitations.275  A fundamental purpose of the Constitution, 
drafted when monarchical prerogative and tyranny were recent memories, is 
to limit the abuse of government power.276  The Constitution does this by 
containing all of its powers within its text, which consists of express or 
implied grants of power stripped from the states and the people of the 
United States and vested in the federal government.277  Claims of power not 
subject to constitutional limitations are more akin to tyranny than a 
democratic system of government. 
Curtiss-Wright’s second great flaw is Justice Sutherland’s skewed 
interpretation of John Marshall’s sole organ theory.278  On March 7, 1800, 
then-Congressman John Marshall argued on the floor of the House of 
Representatives that the President was the “sole organ of the nation in its 
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”279  
Commentators nearly unanimously agree that John Marshall was describing 
the President as the sole organ for communication with foreign 
                                                          
limitations on state involvement in foreign affairs); MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S 
TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 33 (2007) (arguing that the Articles of Confederation do not suggest 
an inherent foreign affairs power).  
 273.  RAMSEY, supra note 272, at 21.  Professor Ramsey also discusses The Federalist as an 
example of ratification era commentary that framed foreign affairs in terms of delegated powers, 
not inherent powers.  Id. at 24.  
 274.  FISHER, supra note 270, at 18; HENKIN, supra note 272, at 25.  That implied powers are 
necessary for the proper functioning of government traces back to McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).  In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall stated that a constitution 
that enumerated every power of government “would partake of the prolixity of a legal code.”  Id.  
Instead, “its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor 
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  
 275.  FISHER, supra note 270, at 18.  
 276.  HENKIN, supra note 272, at 27–28.  
 277.  RAMSEY, supra note 272, at 13.  Professor Ramsey argues that the Tenth Amendment is 
textual evidence that governmental power is either reserved to the states or the people, or 
delegated to the federal government.  Id. at 18.  He quickly points out, however, that this argument 
may be insufficient: “Sutherland in effect argued that the Tenth Amendment’s language cannot be 
taken literally, because the Constitution’s drafters had a background understanding that foreign 
affairs powers could not be delegated (because the states never possessed them) and could not be 
reserved (for the same reason).”  Id. at 19.  
 278.  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
 279.  10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). 
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governments, not the President’s inherent power to conduct foreign 
policy.280  By manipulating the meaning of John Marshall’s speech, 
however, Justice Sutherland concluded that the President was the “sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.”281  
As has already been discussed, this mischaracterization of presidential 
power led to a significantly expanded view of this power after Curtiss-
Wright.282 
The issue in Zivotofsky did not require that the Court right the wrongs 
of Curtiss-Wright.  It could have omitted its entire discussion of Curtiss-
Wright, excluded its correction of Chief Justice John Marshall’s speech, and 
skipped its clarification that the President has no greater power in foreign 
affairs than it has in domestic.  The Court’s holding, as discussed below, 
would still be primarily theoretical.  The Court recognized, however, that it 
had a chance to correct more than seventy-five years of problematic theory 
pervading its foreign affairs jurisprudence.  In taking this opportunity, the 
Zivotofsky Court appropriately “decline[d] to acknowledge [the] unbounded 
power” of Curtiss-Wright, signaling a shift in the theoretical framework for 
deciding foreign affairs-separation of powers cases towards a more 
balanced division of power between Congress and the President.283 
B.  The President Has the Exclusive Recognition Power 
Within the foregoing theoretical framework, the Zivotofsky Court 
correctly held that the President has the exclusive recognition power.  The 
Court divided the recognition power into two components: the power to 
effect recognition,284 and the power to determine recognition policy.285  
                                                          
 280.  HENKIN, supra note 272, at 41; Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The 
“Sole Organ” Doctrine, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 37, March 2007, at 139, 142; Kimberly L. 
Fletcher, The Court’s Decisive Hand Shapes the Executive’s Foreign Affairs Policymaking Power, 
73 MD. L. REV. 247, 259 (2013); Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs 
Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5, 10 (1988).  Only four years 
after this speech, John Marshall penned Little v. Barreme as Chief Justice, further evidence he did 
not intend to convey that the President had inherent power to conduct foreign affairs in his “sole 
organ” speech.  Glennon, supra note 280.  After all, Little held that the President, even during a 
time of war, could only exercise power pursuant to an act of Congress.  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 
177 (1804). 
 281.  Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.  Professor Fisher points out a logical misstep between 
using Justice Sutherland’s argument, and he concludes that the President’s power in foreign affairs 
is exclusive: “Even if the power of external sovereignty had somehow passed intact from the 
Crown to the ‘United States,’ the Constitution divides that power between Congress and the 
President.”  FISHER, supra note 270, at 108.  
 282.  See supra notes 129 & 132 and accompanying text.  
 283.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015).  
 284.  Id. at 2094. 
 285.  See id. at 2090 (“[J]udicial precedent and historical practice teach that it is for the 
President alone to make the specific decision of what foreign power he will recognize as 
legitimate.”). 
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Regarding the President’s power to effect recognition, or “announce” 
recognition policy, the Court’s dispositive reasoning was that the United 
States must speak with “one voice” on issues of recognition, and that voice 
must be the President’s.286  This reasoning has its theoretical roots in the 
widely accepted proposition that it is the sole domain of the President to 
communicate with foreign nations.287  The Court reached the correct 
conclusion on this aspect of the holding because the power to effect 
recognition fits neatly within the President’s role as sole organ of 
communication with other governments. 
Regarding the President’s power to determine recognition policy, the 
Court reached the correct conclusion but failed to subject the issue to a 
sufficiently demanding inquiry.  The extent to which the President may 
unilaterally determine foreign policy strikes at the heart of an ongoing and 
unresolved debate over separation of powers in foreign affairs.288  When the 
Court allocates policymaking power to one political branch over the other, 
it must do so carefully.  For its part, the Court correctly inferred from the 
President’s longstanding practice of unilaterally determining recognition 
policy that he has that exclusive power—but this reasoning was not enough.  
The President does, however, have the exclusive power to determine 
recognition policy because it falls within his “residual foreign affairs 
power” under Article II’s Vesting Clause. 
For most of United States history, courts and commentators have 
viewed the President as the sole organ of communication with foreign 
nations.289  Professor Louis Henkin argued that this power is to be inferred 
from the President’s control over the “foreign affairs apparatus.”290  Article 
II, for example, provides that the President shall appoint “Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls.”291  By way of this power, “those 
                                                          
 286.  Id. at 2086 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)).  
 287.  See supra note 103; see infra note 289. 
 288.  See infra notes 294–306 and accompanying text. 
 289.  EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 214 (Randall 
W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984) (“[T]here is no more securely established principle of 
constitutional practice than the exclusive right of the President to be the nation’s intermediary in 
its dealing with other nations.”); HENKIN, supra note 272, at 42 (“That the President is the sole 
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Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L. J. 231, 233 (2001) (“It is conventional 
wisdom that the President is, at minimum, the ‘sole organ’ of communication with foreign 
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voice’ doctrine is a myth.”); David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 955 
(2014) (arguing that the sole organ doctrine’s “contributions are outweighed by its wide-ranging 
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 290.  HENKIN, supra note 281, at 41.  
 291.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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whom [the President] appoints report and are responsible to him; he directs 
and instructs them, and determines what they shall communicate and what 
they shall withhold.”292  Additionally, the President has broad authority to 
engage in diplomacy and negotiate treaties.293  As is argued in greater depth 
below, Professors Prakash and Ramsey posit a different textual basis for the 
President’s sole organ power: Article II’s Vesting Clause affirmatively 
grants the President “residual power” over foreign affairs, which includes 
the sole power over communication with other nations.294 
Originalist evidence demonstrates that Chief Justice John Marshall 
was not the only ratification-era proponent of the sole organ theory.  James 
Madison, who advocated for an executive branch tightly controlled by the 
legislative branch, still believed that the President’s chief role in foreign 
affairs was as an “instrument” of the national legislature.295  The 
Washington administration, moreover, “asserted and enjoyed a monopoly 
on foreign communications.”296  In fact, Congress requested that the 
Washington administration forward congressional communications to 
foreign nations instead of doing so itself.297  Carrying forward this 
ratification-era practice, the Supreme Court has emphasized the primacy of 
the President’s role as sole organ of communication.298 
The President’s power to effect recognition fits appropriately within 
the scope of this power.  Recognition is “formal acknowledgment that the 
entity possesses the qualifications for statehood.”299  To effect recognition 
is to make a formal acknowledgment, which can be written, oral, or implied 
by concluding a treaty or receiving ambassadors.300  Therefore, by its very 
nature, the act of effecting recognition is a communicative act.  For this 
reason, the President’s role as sole organ of communication with foreign 
nations naturally encompasses the power to effect recognition.  The 
Zivotofsky Court, arguing that the President must be the sole voice of 
United States’ recognition policy, correctly nested the President’s exclusive 
power to effect recognition within the President’s sole organ power. 
                                                          
 292.  HENKIN, supra note 272, at 41–42.  The Zivotofsky Court listed similar considerations as 
“traditional avenues of recognition,” in support of its argument that the President has the exclusive 
recognition power.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015). 
 293.  HENKIN, supra note 272, at 88.  But see FISHER, supra note 270, at 249 (“[T]he 
negotiation of treaties has often been shared with the Senate in order to secure legislative 
understanding and support.”).  
 294.  Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 289, at 323. 
 295.  CORWIN, supra note 289, at 210.  
 296.  Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian 
Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1673 (2005).  
 297.  Id.  
 298.  See supra note 103.  
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cmt. a (1987).  
 300.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015).  
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While the power to effect recognition fits uncontroversially within the 
President’s sole organ power, the President’s power to determine 
recognition policy implicates a wholly unsettled debate.301  In Zivotofsky, 
the Court aggregated its analysis of the power over recognition policy with 
the power over effecting recognition.  The Court should have subjected the 
question to a more rigorous inquiry.  If it had, this Note argues that the 
Court would have concluded that the President has the exclusive power to 
determine recognition policy through Article II’s Vesting Clause. 
The Vesting Clause theory holds that Article II’s Vesting Clause, 
which vests the “executive power” in the President, is an affirmative grant 
of power.302  The argument most famously originates with Alexander 
Hamilton during the Pacificus-Helvidius debates.303  Hamilton, writing as 
Pacificus, argued that Article II’s Vesting Clause vests not only the duty to 
execute legislation, but also comprehends “the whole of Executive Power” 
as it was defined at that time.304  Hamilton’s theory, based on the writings 
of Montesquieu, Locke, and Blackstone, held that the executive power 
included “independent, major, substantive powers to ‘determine the 
condition of the nation in its foreign relations.’”305  Further, the President 
has “all powers that the facts of international intercourse may at anytime 
make conveniently applicable if the Constitution does not vest them 
elsewhere in clear terms.”306 
The Vesting Clause, in the first instance, is rooted in the text of the 
Constitution.  Both Articles I and II have vesting clauses, but the two are 
distinct: Article I’s Vesting Clause vests Congress with all legislative 
powers “herein granted,”307 but Article II’s Vesting Clause omits those 
words.308  Today, this distinction permits the inference that Congress may 
exercise powers only pursuant to those enumerated, and the President is not 
subject to that limitation.309  During the ratification era, however, the 
distinction did not depend on inference: it was commonly understood that 
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the “executive power” included broad authority over foreign affairs.310  
From this originalist interpretation of “executive power,” modern 
proponents of the Vesting Clause theory argue that the President—prior to 
ratification—had a general power over foreign affairs.311  When the 
Framers drafted the Constitution, they stripped some powers from the 
President’s “executive power” and enumerated them in Article I.312  As a 
result, the President is precluded from regulating foreign commerce, 
declaring war, or making laws related to foreign affairs, and cannot enter 
into treaties or appoint public officials without the consent of Congress.313  
What remains of the President’s residual foreign affairs power in Article 
II’s Vesting Clause, however, permits the President to “set and announce 
the foreign policy of the federal government.”314  Indeed, the Vesting 
Clause theory explains many conspicuous silences in the Constitution 
relating to foreign affairs.315 
Pursuant to the President’s residual foreign affairs power, he has the 
exclusive power to determine recognition policy.316  Historical practice 
reflects this.  In 1793, President George Washington conferred with his 
cabinet on the question of whether he should receive a diplomat from the 
post-revolution government of France.317  The cabinet agreed, and 
Washington received the French Ambassador “without consultation with or 
direction from Congress.”318  Since that time, the President has unilaterally 
determined recognition policy for most of United States’ history.319  On 
most occasions, the President has unilaterally determined recognition policy 
towards a foreign sovereign and then effected the recognition without 
consulting Congress.320  Much less often Congress and the President have 
collaborated on a recognition issue, and only four times in history has 
                                                          
 310.  YOO, supra note 309, at 36–45; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 289, at 266. 
 311.  Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 289, at 252.  
 312.  Id. at 355. 
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 318.  Id.  
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Congress unilaterally exercised the recognition power.321  Though 
longstanding practice is not conclusive evidence of constitutionality, it is 
“weighty” evidence of constitutionality.322  It is also indicative of the 
President’s institutional competence to exercise the power.  As Professor 
Harold Koh explains, Congress is “poorly structured for initiative and 
leadership” because it is a bicameral institution made up of individuals, 
each subject to pressure from geographically dispersed power bases.323  The 
President, in contrast, can act “swiftly and secretly to respond to fast-
moving international events.”324 
Thus, although the Court erred in aggregating the analysis of the 
President’s power to determine recognition policy with the President’s 
power to effect recognition, the Court correctly concluded that the President 
has the exclusive authority to exercise the recognition power. 
C.  Section 214(d) Does Not Infringe on the President’s Recognition 
Power 
After the Zivotofsky Court defined the scope of the recognition power, 
it held that Congress cannot force the President to “contradict his own 
statement[s] regarding a determination of formal recognition.”325  The 
Court’s key reasoning for this conclusion was that the President’s 
recognition power was sufficiently exclusive that it “disabl[es] the Congress 
from acting upon the subject.”326  In “disabling” Congress, the Court 
invoked Justice Jackson’s exception to Category Three, reserved for 
“conclusive and preclusive” claims to Presidential power.327 
The Court erred, however, in promulgating so broad a rule on 
infringement.  First, the Court’s holding too greatly invades Congress’s 
lawmaking power by prohibiting otherwise constitutional acts of 
                                                          
 321.  Reinstein, supra note 319.  
 322.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 
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determination . . . .  As a result it is unconstitutional.”).  
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Congress.328  Second, the rule’s intention of preventing Congress from 
undermining an act of recognition is shortsighted because Congress can 
undermine an act of recognition by acting outside the scope of the rule.  The 
rule on infringement too greatly invades Congress’ lawmaking power for 
too little benefit.  The Court should have instead limited the circumstances 
of infringement only to formal acts of recognition, thus “disabling” 
Congress from exercising formal recognition.  Because Section 214(d) is 
not an act of formal recognition, the Court should have held that the statute 
does not infringe on the President’s recognition power. 
The Zivotofsky Court attempts to make a distinction between acts of 
Congress that express disagreement with a President’s act of recognition,329 
and acts of Congress that force the President to contradict his own 
statements regarding recognition.330  The Court implies that this distinction 
matters because if Congress forces the President to contradict an act of 
recognition, the recognized country may construe its legitimacy to the 
United States government as equivocal.331  Such equivocation concerned 
the Court, presumably, because it would undermine the President’s initial 
act of recognition and could endanger international relations.  The Court 
concedes, however, that Congress is free to “express its disagreement” with 
an act of recognition by acting or refusing to take action in accordance with 
its Article I powers, such as refusing to confirm an ambassador, ease trade 
restrictions or consent to a treaty.332  The Court admits that Congress 
expressing disagreement in this way would also undermine a President’s act 
of recognition.333 
The assumption underlying this distinction is that an act of Congress 
undermining a recognition policy clearly originating from Congress was 
tolerable, but an act of Congress undermining a recognition policy 
ultimately voiced by the President, somehow, so significantly undermines a 
recognition policy that it should be prohibited.  This subtle difference is 
noted, but it fails to account for the fact that Congress could severely 
undermine an act of recognition pursuant to a valid exercise of power—at 
least according to the Zivotofsky Court.  For example, Congress could 
declare war on the country at issue, or refuse to enter into a trade 
agreement.334  It is difficult to understand how a statute allowing U.S. 
                                                          
 328.  The Court’s holding necessarily and specifically refers to otherwise constitutionally 
enacted legislation because the only alternative interpretation—Congress may not enact 
independently unconstitutional legislation that forces the President to contradict a statement of 
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 329.  Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087.  
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citizens born in Jerusalem to choose to have “Israel” recorded as the 
birthplace on their passports more detrimentally undermines a recognition 
policy than other actions that Congress could take.  The Court’s rule, which 
seeks to protect the President’s recognition policies and United States 
foreign relations, does not account for this disparity in reasoning. 
Professor Robert Reinstein’s discussion of sole executive agreements 
with foreign governments illustrates the danger of allowing presidential 
power to trump otherwise constitutional legislation.335  He explains that, 
like the recognition power, sole executive agreements have no clear textual 
basis in the Constitution.336  Nevertheless, the President has regularly 
entered into sole executive agreements with foreign nations such that, when 
unchallenged, it is assumed that the President has the implied authority to 
do so.337  When a sole executive agreement conflicts with federal law, 
however, federal law has always prevailed, indicating that despite the 
implied power, the President cannot “displace or override the legislative 
powers of Congress.”338  Under this reasoning, the President should not be 
able to contravene a statute even if it contradicts a statement on recognition.  
After all, it is the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”339  Therefore, the Supreme Court should not have created an 
exception for the recognition power.  As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, 
the Court took “the perilous step—for the first time in our history—of 
allowing the President to defy an Act of Congress in the field of foreign 
affairs.”340 
The Zivotofsky Court appeared to disregard Justice Jackson’s 
admonition that “what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our 
constitutional system.”341  Although the President’s recognition power is 
both “conclusive and preclusive,” the Court went too far in defining how it 
could “disable” Congress from acting.  Instead, the Court should have 
limited its rule of infringement to only an exercise of the recognition power 
by any branch of the government besides the President.  By effectively 
prohibiting otherwise constitutional legislation that falls in the Court’s new 
category of “forced contradictory statements,” the Court unconstitutionally 
strips away Congress’s lawmaking authority and expands the President’s 
power over recognition.  In doing so, the Court undermined its own 
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assurances that Congress has a role to play in foreign affairs and, 
ultimately, backslid toward Curtiss-Wright.342 
D.  Congress Had Constitutional Authority to Enact Section 214(d) 
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause 
Zivotofsky brought suit to enforce Section 214(d).  Because Section 
214(d) does not infringe on the recognition power, the Court should have 
addressed whether Congress had authority to enact the statute. As discussed 
above, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed Congress’s 
constitutional authority to enact passport legislation.343  Congress has, 
however, enacted legislation relating to passport regulation for more than 
two centuries, and, in the vast majority of cases involving such legislation, 
the Court has assumed Congress has the authority to do so.344  Even in 
Zivotofsky, the Court expressly acknowledged that it did not “question the 
power of Congress to enact passport legislation of wide scope,” pursuant to 
the “extensive lawmaking power the Constitution vests in Congress over 
the Nation’s foreign affairs.”345  While longstanding practice is not 
conclusive evidence of constitutionality,346 the strong inference that may be 
gleaned from Congress’s ongoing practice of enacting passport legislation 
is that it has some authority to do it.347 
This Part argues that Congress has that authority under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.  The Zivotofsky Court could have easily upheld Section 
214(d) as a proper exercise of congressional power under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.348  The statute, which concerns the place of birth of a 
passport bearer, regulates the content of passports, which in turn regulates 
human movement through channels of foreign commerce.  Additionally, 
passports are instruments of foreign commerce.349 
Lower courts have held that a person traveling internationally is 
“traveling in foreign commerce.”  In United States v. Clark,350 the Ninth 
Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting a person who 
“travels in foreign commerce” from engaging in “illicit sexual conduct with 
another person.”351  The court explained that “travels in foreign commerce” 
unambiguously invokes the Foreign Commerce Clause, and by traveling by 
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plane from the United States to Cambodia, the defendant satisfied the 
“travels in foreign commerce” element of the statute.352  The Fifth Circuit, 
too, has explained, “Congress intended foreign commerce to mean travel to 
or from, or at least some form of contact with, a foreign state.”353 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Clark has sparked debate over the 
reach of the Foreign Commerce Clause.354  The focus of the criticism, 
however, is not whether traveling internationally, or through “channels of 
foreign commerce,” is sufficient to invoke the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.355  Instead, Clark’s holding is controversial because it grants 
Congress jurisdiction over conduct in foreign countries after the 
individual’s use of the channel of foreign commerce has ceased.356  
Describing “travel in foreign commerce” as a “jurisdictional hook,” 
commentators caution that courts should not so broadly define the Foreign 
Commerce Clause such that it extends to all conduct in foreign nations.357  
Notably, the commentators do not challenge Congress’s authority to 
regulate foreign travel by regulating foreign travel itself.358 
Passport regulation falls squarely within Congress’s power to regulate 
people traveling through channels of foreign commerce.  Under federal law, 
a person may not enter or exit the United States without a valid passport.359  
By controlling who can enter and exit the country, passport regulation is the 
direct regulation of people engaging in foreign travel.  The implications of 
passport regulation, moreover, are not as controversial as the statute in 
Clark; passports regulate human travel through channels of foreign 
commerce, and have little to do—if anything—with human conduct in 
foreign countries after the travel has ceased.  In this sense, passport 
regulation is relatively insular—it concerns a travel document that serves as 
identification specifically intended to facilitate the safe journey of United 
States citizens through channels of foreign commerce.  Moreover, the 
                                                          
 352.  Id. at 1114.  
 353.  United States v. Montford, 27 F.3d 137, 139–40 (5th Cir. 1994).  
 354.  See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 999 
(2010) (arguing that the statute in Clark does not establish a sufficient nexus between foreign 
travel, which is subject to the foreign commerce power, and illegal conduct subsequent to that 
travel, which is not necessarily within the foreign commerce power); Julie Buffington, Note, 
Taking the Ball and Running With It: U.S. v. Clark and Congress’s Unlimited Power Under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 841, 858 (2006) (arguing that Congress should not 
have broader power to regulate conduct abroad pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause than it 
has in regulating citizen’s interstate conduct).  
 355.  Colangelo, supra note 354, at 997. 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  See id. at 999–1000 (“To uphold Section 2423(c) on a channels-of-commerce theory 
therefore is a radical move, and would mean that any time a U.S. citizen or permanent resident 
travels in foreign commerce, every subsequent act by that individual is within Congress’s 
regulatory authority.”).  
 358.  Id. at 997. 
 359.  8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2012). 
 902 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:865 
passport book itself is an instrumentality of foreign commerce.  The 
Eleventh Circuit has defined instrumentalities of interstate commerce as 
“the people and things moving in commerce,” including cars, airplanes, 
boats, pagers, telephones, mobile phones and shipments of goods.360  Just as 
a car, airplane or boat is means that facilitate a person’s travel through 
channels of foreign commerce, so, too, is a passport. 
Turning to Section 214(d) specifically, the statute is passport 
legislation that falls within the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause.  The 
statute, which allows a United States citizen born in Jerusalem to designate 
his or her place of birth as “Israel,” independently passes constitutional 
muster because it regulates an aspect of the passport that relates to the 
identity of the bearer.  Determining the identity of a passport bearer directly 
relates to the passport’s purpose of safe and effective regulation of people 
moving through channels of foreign commerce.  According to the State 
Department Foreign Affairs Manual, the “place of birth” designation is an 
integral part of establishing an individual’s identity.361  It distinguishes that 
individual from other persons with similar names and/or dates of birth, and 
helps identify claimants attempting to use another person’s identity.362  The 
information also facilitates retrieval of passport records that assists the 
Department in determining citizenship or notifying next of kin in case of 
emergency.363  Thus, as the State Department acknowledges, the birthplace 
of a passport bearer is integral to the safe international travel of United 
States citizens.364 
One might argue that Section 214(d) does not have the objective of 
regulating foreign commerce; after all, the name of the section of the 
provision is “United States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital 
of Israel.”365  The Supreme Court has held, however, that if Congress is 
directly regulating foreign commerce or an instrumentality of foreign 
commerce, Congress’s objective of the legislation is irrelevant.366  In 
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United States v. Darby,367 the Court declared, “Whatever their motive and 
purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe on some 
constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on 
Congress by the Commerce Clause.”368  Under this reasoning, even if 
Section 214(d) does not advance a specific foreign commerce objective, it is 
constitutional if it regulates foreign commerce and does not infringe on 
some other constitutional limitation.  The statute, as has been established, 
directly regulates information pertaining to the identification of its bearer, 
which has integral importance to the effective regulation of people traveling 
through channels of foreign commerce.  Thus, regardless of whether the 
birthplace designation on a person’s passport promotes foreign commerce, 
it directly regulates the channels of foreign commerce by controlling who 
can pass through them.  To conclude, Congress had proper authority under 
the Foreign Commerce Clause to enact Section 214(d). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court struck down Section 214(d) 
as an unconstitutional invasion of the President’s exclusive recognition 
power.369  Lacking doctrine to guide its analysis, the Court relied primarily 
on theoretical principles to reach its decision.370  Specifically, the Court 
rejected the pervasive dicta of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., edging the theoretical framework to a more balanced division of 
power.371  On the merits, the Court held that the President had the exclusive 
recognition power, citing the need for the nation to speak with “one voice” 
on issues of recognition.372  Additionally, the Court concluded that 
Congress could force the President to contradict statements on 
recognition.373  Though the Court reached the correct conclusion on the 
issue of recognition, it erred on defining what constitutes infringement of 
the recognition power.  In a thinly veiled attempt to extend the reach of the 
recognition power to Section 214(d), the Court unconstitutionally stripped 
some of Congress’s lawmaking powers.  Despite the Court’s efforts to 
correct the wrongs of Curtiss-Wright, the Court failed to live by its own 
lesson.  Ultimately, the Court should have upheld Section 214(d) and 
ordered the State Department issue a passport to Zivotofsky with his 
birthplace recorded as “Israel.” 
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Section 214(d) is inarguably troublesome.  It contradicts longstanding 
United States policy as to the status of Jerusalem, and will likely be 
interpreted by some as an equivocation on our policy.  The goal of this Note 
is not to discount the sensitivity of the political climate in the Middle East, 
nor to advocate for any change in the government’s policy with respect to 
Jerusalem.  The focus instead is on the importance of striking the delicate 
balance of power between the political branches—especially with respect to 
constitutional issues of first impression.  Zivotofsky highlights the 
challenging decisions that the Court must make in absence of textual 
guidance.  In no small way, the Court in Zivotofsky had to choose between 
the United States’ unwavering policy as to the status of Jerusalem and the 
integrity of its separation of powers jurisprudence.  The Court chose the 
former, at the cost of the latter.   
